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Abstract
We present a randomized controlled trial for a model-in-the-loop regression task,
with the goal of measuring the extent to which (1) good explanations of model
predictions increase human accuracy, and (2) faulty explanations decrease human
trust in the model. We study explanations based on visual saliency in an image-
based age prediction task for which humans and learned models are individually
capable but not highly proficient and frequently disagree. Our experimental design
separates model quality from explanation quality, and makes it possible to compare
treatments involving a variety of explanations of varying levels of quality. We
find that presenting model predictions improves human accuracy. However, visual
explanations of various kinds fail to significantly alter human accuracy or trust in
the model—regardless of whether explanations characterize an accurate model,
an inaccurate one, or are generated randomly and independently of the input
image. These findings suggest the need for greater evaluation of explanations
in downstream decision making tasks, better design-based tools for presenting
explanations to users, and better approaches for generating explanations.
1 Introduction
While significant research effort has been devoted to automatically explaining decisions from machine
learning models, it remains an open question to what extent these explanations are useful for
humans in downstream applications. One fundamental assumption underlying much interpretable
machine learning research is that more faithful and accurate explanations help people use models
more effectively—explanations indicating that models have identified features relevant to the target
prediction should increase human confidence in predictions, and explanations indicating that models
have latched onto noise or irrelevant features should decrease trust [35, 40, 29, 13]. However, most
evaluation of explanations has focused on their intrinsic relation to model properties [8, 30, 35, 40]
rather than their effect on human decision-making. Here we investigate (1) whether explanation
quality actually impacts model-in-the-loop human performance, and (2) whether explanation quality
impacts human trust in the model.
We present a randomized controlled trial (RCT) involving model-in-the-loop decision making in
a nontrivial perception problem with a modern neural prediction architecture and interpretability
method. Our work follows recent RCTs studying related questions [7, 16, 17, 25, 26, 34, 41, 49], but
critically, our setup allows us to isolate the effect of explanations of varying quality in a scenario
with more complex models and inputs. We include in our experiments both faithful explanations of a
high-quality model, via integrated gradients [40], and a variety of “faulty explanations”—saliency
maps from a model trained on data with spurious correlations and completely uninformative random
explanations, as shown in Figure 1. We find that neither faulty explanations nor accurate ones
significantly affect task accuracy, trust in the model predictions, or understanding of the model.
Counter-intuitively, even the obviously unreliable explanations shown in Figure 1c and 1d fail to
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(a) Original image (b) “Strong” (c) “Spurious” (d) “Random”
Figure 1: Images and varying saliency maps used in explanation-based treatments in our age prediction
task. Participants are shown an image, a prediction from our strong model, and either a “strong”,
“spurious”, or “random” explanation. The strong explanations are derived from the strong model
and focus on details of the face. The spurious explanations are derived from a model trained on
data with spurious correlations and tend to focus on both the face and the background. The random
explanations are input-agnostic and focus on the background of the image.
.
significantly decrease trust in the model. All of these explanation-based treatments are comparable
to each other, and to other treatments such as personifying the model with a name and an image
that reveal nothing about its behavior. Ultimately, our studies point to the limited effectiveness of
pixel-level visual explanations in this model-in-the-loop setting, and motivate research on better
explanations, communication of the meaning of explanations, and training of users to interpret them.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 Task
We study a model-in-the-loop scenario, where participants are shown an input and a model’s predic-
tion, and then asked to make their own guess. Our study examines the age prediction task, where
users guess a person’s age given an image of their face. We chose this task because (a) both models
and humans can perform the task with some proficiency, but with far from perfect accuracy, and (b) it
is representative of high-stakes real-world scenarios that use similar models in passport recognition
and law enforcement [37, 1]. A discussion of the ethical concerns of tasks that involve predicting
demographic features can be found in the Broader Impact section.
Users are shown images from the validation and test of the APPA-REAL dataset [14], which contains
7,591 images with real age labels. We sample images uniformly across ages, and many images are
seen by multiple users. We also balance the dataset shown to users by combining equal proportions
of images for which the model is more accurate than previously collected human guesses (available
in the APPA-REAL data), and vice versa. This allows us to have greater coverage over the more
interesting decision space in which the human and model disagree. The model in our model-in-the-
loop task is a Wide Resnet [48] pre-trained on the IMDB-WIKI dataset [36] and fine-tuned on the
APPA-REAL dataset. Trained to predict the real ages, this model gets near human-performance with
a 5.24 mean absolute error (MAE) on the test set of APPA-REAL, and is more accurate than the
previously collected guesses 46.9% of the time. We call this the “strong” model.
2.2 Treatments
Users are randomly placed into different experimental conditions, or treatment arms, allowing us
to measure the effect of specific interventions. Different treatments vary aspects of the human-AI
system, such as whether the model prediction is shown and what kind of explanation accompanies
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(a) Description of the model and guidelines for inter-
preting and using the explanations. (b) Users are asked to guess a person’s age.
Figure 2: Webapp used to run the human study. Elements boxed in orange are shown or not shown
depending on the treatment arm. The model prediction is shown in all cases except the control,
and in additional treatments discussed in the Appendix. The saliency map in (b) is shown in the
Explanation-based treatments. The description of the model performance in (a) is shown in all
treatments involving the model, except for two additional treatments discussed in the Appendix.
it. Elements of the experiment are shown in Figure 2, including how model predictions is presented
to the participants. The full set of treatments are listed in Table S2. Our main experiments focus
on the effect of showing explanations of varying quality alongside model predictions. Additional
experiments further exploring showing explanations alone, and the effect of the description of the
model performance, are described in the Appendix.
Baseline treatments Our two main baselines are (a) the Control treatment, in which the user
guesses without the help of the model, and (b) the Prediction treatment, in which the user guesses
with the model prediction shown but without an explanation shown.
Explanation-based treatments These treatments show explanations in addition to the model
prediction. Our explanations are pixel-wise importances, or saliency maps, calculated using integrated
gradients [40]. For each pixel, we sum the absolute value of the channel-wise attributions, then
normalize these pixel attribution scores by the 98th percentile of scores across that image. Users are
given a guide for how to interpret the saliency maps (Figure 2a) and also explicitly asked to consider
the explanation when making their own guess.
Explanations of varying quality are shown in Figure 1. In addition to the strong explanations, we also
tested two versions of lower quality saliency maps. Importantly, these varying explanations are all
shown with predictions from the same strong model, which isolates the effect of the explanation.
• Explain-strong. These are saliency maps from the same model whose predictions are shown
to users. These explanations tend to focus on, in decreasing order, (a) the areas around the
eyes, (b) lines anywhere on the face, and (c) regions around the mouth and nose.
• Explain-spurious. We train a “spurious” model by modifying the APPA-REAL dataset to
contain spurious correlations between the background and the label. The area outside the
face bounding box is modified by scaling the pixel values by α, which is a linear mapping
f(age) from the [0,100] age range to a value in [0.25, 5.0]. Saliency maps from the spurious
model often focus on both the face and the background. As with all explanation-based
treatments, we show the spurious model’s saliency map with the predictions from the strong
model.
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• Explain-random. We also test completely uninformative, input-agnostic saliency maps
that do not focus on the face. To generate these attributions, we first sample an anchor
point around the border of the image. We then sample 50 points in a window around the
anchor point, which are used as the centers for 2D Gaussians that we then combine. These
are similarly normalized and mapped to the same colorscale as the integrated gradients
attributions.
“Algorithmic aversion” refers to human loss of trust in a model after seeing it make a mistake [12, 47].
Our question is whether faulty explanations could act as a similar deterrent. A model may be accurate
overall but still have undesired behavior. Explanations could expose those deficiencies and serve as a
nudge to not trust the model.
Design-based treatments We also compare against existing and novel design-based treatments,
which vary the description of the model and the way the model’s predictions are shown. We are
interested in whether these simple framing approaches can be as effective at increasing accuracy or
trust as explanation-based treatments. The Delayed Prediction treatment tests the effect of anchoring
bias [22] and was previously shown to work well for improving accuracy in [17]. We record the initial
guess, show the model prediction, then ask for a final guess. The Empathetic treatment personifies
the model as an AI named Pat, shown in Figure S1 in the appendix. When a human perceives a
computer to be more similar to themselves, they may be more cooperative and find information from
the computer to be of higher quality [31]. We state “Like every teammate, Pat isn’t perfect” and show
Pat next to every prediction. The Show Top-3 Range treatment tests a form of uncertainty by showing
the range of the models’s top 3 predicted ages. The user is told “The AI’s guess will be shown as
a range, e.g. 27-29. Sometimes the range may be wider, e.g. 27-35. When the range is wider, this
means the AI is more uncertain about its guess.”
2.3 Metrics
We measure and analyze four quantities: (1) the error of the user’s guess (the absolute value of the
difference between the guess and the ground-truth age label), (2) trust (quantified as the absolute
value of the difference between the guess and the model’s prediction), (3) the time spent making
the guess, and (4) answers to post-survey questions on how the model prediction was used in their
decision-making process and how reasonable the explanations seemed. Our definition of trust follows
previous work operationalizing trust as agreement with model predictions [47, 49, 26].
We use a mixed-effects regression model to estimate error and trust as defined above. The model
includes fixed-effect terms βimage_age, the age of the person in the image (which is correlated with
the absolute error, ρ = 0.21, p < 2.2e−16), and βtreatment, for each of the treatments. We also include
random-effect intercept terms zuser and zimage to capture effects specific to each image and user. The
model is defined as follows, where ⟨target⟩ is the error or trust defined above.
y⟨target⟩ = β0 + βtreatment ⋅ xtreatment + βimage_age ⋅ ximage_age + zuser ⋅ xuser + zimage ⋅ ximage +  (1)
2.4 Experiment Details
We ran experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, with 1,058 participants. Participants were incen-
tivized to perform well on the task by paying top performers a 100% bonus. Prior to data collection,
we conducted a two-tailed power analysis using the mean and standard deviation of previously
collected guesses in the APPA-REAL dataset. In order to detect 1 year differences between treat-
ments, we needed to collect 546 guesses per treatment. We ultimately collected 827.5 guesses (82.75
participants) per treatment, which would allow us to detect a 1 year difference of means at the p <
0.05 level with probability 93%.
3 Analysis and Results
The overall mean absolute errors per treatment are shown in Table 1. For more detailed analysis,
we control for image- and user-specific effects using the regression model in Equation 1, shown in
Figures 3 and 4. This allows us to more precisely quantify the additional effect of explanation-based
treatments on error relative to a human-only control (Figure 3) and the effect of explanations on trust
relative to a prediction-only control (Figure 4). In addition to a regression on the overall data, we also
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analyzed subsets of the data, defined by the mean of all human and model errors (8.65). For example,
the “good human, bad model” subset, denoted Human+Model- and H+M- for short, is the set of
datapoints where the human guess was more accurate and the model prediction was less accurate
than the average human and model guess. There are 1802 and 1721 guesses in the H+M- and H-M+
settings, respectively. Using these experiments, we aim to understand the effect of explanations on
human use and perception of model predictions.
3.1 How do model predictions and explanation quality affect model-in-the-loop accuracy?
Table 1: Mean absolute error of guesses. Boot-
strapped 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
Results for all treatments are in Appendix Section
B. We note that the MAE is higher for the “Model
Alone” case than the MAE stated in Section 2 be-
cause we sample uniformly across the entire age
range, and errors are often much larger when the
person is older.
Treatment Arm MAE
Control (Human Alone) 10.0 (9.4 - 10.5)
Model Alone 8.5 (8.3 - 8.7)
Prediction 8.4 (7.8 - 9.0)
Explain-strong 8.0 (7.5 - 8.5)
Explain-spurious 8.5 (8.0 - 9.1)
Explain-random 8.7 (8.1 - 9.2)
Delayed Prediction 8.5 (8.0 - 9.0)
Empathetic 8.0 (7.6 - 8.5)
Show Top-3 Range 8.0 (7.4 - 8.5)
Participants in the Empathetic, Show Top-
3 Range, and Explain-strong treatments
performed best and outperformed humans
without AI. Participants shown the model
prediction are more accurate by 2 years on
average overall, as seen in Figure 3. The pre-
dictions generally help whenever the human is
inaccurate (H-M+, H-M-), but can hurt when
the human is accurate and the model is inac-
curate (H+M-).
The top-performing treatments have similar
effects overall. However, their effects vary in
different settings. For example, Show Top-3
Range is potentially more helpful in the H-M+
setting, with a 4.55 improvement in accuracy,
and also the only top treatment to not have a
statistically significant harmful effect in the
H+M- setting. However, we note that Tukey
HSD testing indicates that the pairwise differ-
ences between all of these top treatments is
not statistically significant.
The results are also a reminder of the importance of the design of the human-AI system, with
the Empathetic and Show Top-3 Range treatments equally or more effective as our explanation-
based treatments. Understanding these approaches may also help design better explanation-based
approaches, as there may be underlying mechanisms that affect both. For example, the Empathetic
and Explain-strong treatments both increase trust, and it could be that the former does so through an
emotional approach while the latter does so through more logical means.
Improved accuracy is not attributable to the amount of time spent making guesses: participants in
the Control took 5.7 seconds per image, compared to Empathetic (6.4), Explain-strong (5.9), Show
Top-3 Range (5.4), and Prediction (5.2).
The addition of explanations did not improve accuracy. As seen in Figure 3a, the Explain-
strong treatment has a similar effect size to the Prediction treatment. This, along with additional
explanation-without-prediction treatments detailed in Appendix Sections A.2 and B, which resulted
in small and non statistically significant effects, indicate the limited utility of these explanations for
such a visual classification task. Survey responses indicate that participants did indeed examine the
highlighted areas and focus on important features such as location-specific wrinkles, but could not
extract information that would boost their performance.
It is possible that our results would change if users were extensively trained to interpret and use the
saliency maps, instead of only being presented with our short guide. We do note, however, that prior
work on training users to interpret saliency map explanations in a different task did not increase
performance when model predictions were also shown [26, 25]. We believe nevertheless that one
broader takeaway remains the same — designers of human-AI systems should question the utility of
pixel-level saliency explanations when designing ML-powered tools.
The quality of explanations had little effect on accuracy. Though directionally what one might
expect overall (explain-strong < explain-spurious < explain-random), the differences are small and
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(a) Overall
(b) Human+Model- (c) Human-Model+
Figure 3: Estimates for yerror regression. Intercept represents control treatment (human alone);
other estimates are relative to the intercept. Lower values are better, indicating reduced error.
Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are shown. Starred items are statistically significant, calculated
with Bonferroni correction: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Additional treatments and settings are
in Appendix Section B. While showing the model prediction increased accuracy, the explanation-
based treatments did not differ significantly from showing the prediction alone. Pairwise differences
between the top treatments were also not statistically significant, in all three settings shown.
not statistically significant in any setting. This is likely related to how explanation quality had little
impact on the trust participants placed in the model predictions, discussed in the following section.
3.2 How does explanation quality affect human trust and understanding?
Faulty explanations did not significantly decrease trust in model predictions. We use the same
regression model as in Equation 1 but with “trust”, the absolute value of the difference between the
model’s prediction and the user’s guess, as the outcome variable. Smaller differences would indicate
that explanations can increase the degree to which humans believe model predictions are accurate.
The results are in Figure 4. Strong explanations could increase trust up to 1.08 years (CI lower bound)
relative to the Prediction treatment (no explanations), while the random explanations could decrease
trust up to 1.48 years (CI upper bound). These effect sizes could be sizable (30-40% relative to the
intercept mean), but no treatment was statistically significant. Moreover, the difference between the
spurious and random saliency maps is small, and none of the pairwise differences are statistically
significant. These findings hold even when the model prediction is inaccurate (Model-), indicating
that users are not learning to trust the model based on its predictions alone.
These findings, coupled with the large differences in accuracy between the H+M- and H-M+ settings
and the decrease in accuracy in the H+M- setting (Figure 3), raise the question to what degree humans
can identify and ignore erroneous model predictions. For example, a model that is accurate 98% of
the time but makes large errors in the remaining 2% can be very dangerous in a high-stakes scenario
if humans default to trusting all model predictions. Importantly, these subsets are typically unknown
on test sets. Two possible approaches to alleviate this problem are (a) surfacing uncertainty measures
as touched upon in the Show Top-3 Range treatment, and (b) training users by showing common
model errors on a validation set. We also briefly expand upon the complementarity of human guesses
and model decisions in Appendix Section C.2.
Most participants claimed that explanations appeared reasonable, even when they were obvi-
ously not focused on faces. Responses out of 7 to the post-survey question, “How easy to under-
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(a) Overall
(b) Human+Model- (c) Human-Model+
Figure 4: Estimates for ytrust regression. Intercept represents the Prediction treatment; other
estimates are relative to the intercept. Smaller values indicate more trust, i.e. smaller difference
between model prediction and human guess. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are shown.
Starred items are statistically significant, calculated with Bonferroni correction: *p<0.05, **p<0.01,
***p<0.001. Additional stats are in Appendix Section B. Pairwise differences between explanation-
based treatments were not significant, and faulty explanations did not significnatly decrease trust.
stand were the AI’s explanations? Did the explanations seem reasonable?”, are shown in Figure 5.
Despite the clear flaws in the saliency maps shown in Figure 1, there were only small differences
between the treatments. Participants shown a strong explanation rated the explanations 5.37 / 7,
versus 5.05 and 4.71 for the spurious and random explanations. In the next section, we provide
qualitative examples to shed some light into these counterintuitive findings.
3.3 How did humans incorporate model predictions and explanations into their decision
making process?
Figure 5: Distribution, mean, and 95%
confidence intervals on the intelligiblity
of explanations. Response on a 1-7 Lik-
ert scale. Participants rated explanations
similarly, regardless of the quality of the
explanations.
Responses to the post-survey question “How did you use
the model’s prediction in your decision-making process?”
provide some clues to the workings of our human-AI sys-
tem. Participants in the Explain-random treatment did
highlight the randomness of the saliency maps, with one
saying “I took it slightly into consideration but didn’t
weight it heavily because it looked like the model was
picking inaccurate locations...”. However, many others
focused simply on the accuracy of the prediction, with one
stating “Well it did a poor job recognizing face or features
but the ages sound mostly correct so i sort of went with
it”. We again note, however, that faulty explanations did
not significantly decrease trust even in the presence of
inaccurate model predictions (Figure 3b). Participants in
the Explain-spurious treatment were similar, sometimes
noting that the explanations were “totally out of whack,
like on the wall”, but with only a few, explicit statements
of these explanations mediating judgment, such as “If it was close to an area that might actually
matter (neck, under eyes, edges of mouth etc) I took it into consideration, but if not, I dismissed it.”
We also examined responses for the top 75 guessers in terms of mean error, (collective MAE of 5.19).
Answers to how the model prediction was used were bucketed into 6 categories: (1) 10.3% ignored it,
(2) 17.9% considered it, (3) 5.1% used it if they were unsure, (4) 28.2% used the model prediction as
a starting point, (5) 21.8% had their own initial guess and adjusted based on the model prediction, (6)
9.0% used the model prediction if it seemed reasonable; otherwise gave their own guess.
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4 Related Work
Interpretable machine learning There has been a wide range of methods, including instance-level
explanations [35] vs. global explanations based on feature representations across the dataset [4],
glass-box methods with access to model gradients [40, 39] vs. black box methods [35, 32], and input
feature attributions [35, 40, 39, 32, 4] vs. natural language explanations [20, 27] vs. counterfactuals
[43]. Input feature attributions has been a common approach, which we use for our experiment.
Evaluating explanations has included human assessments of correctness, attempts to derive insights
from explanations, and seeing if explanations help humans predict model behavior [40, 35, 11, 30].
Recent work has also suggested that popular interpretability methods exhibit undesirable properties,
such as being unreliably and unreasonably sensitive to minor changes in the input [21, 23, 16].
Model-in-the-Loop experiments Previous experiments have mixed results on the effect of expla-
nations. In a deceptive review detection task, explanations alone helped human performance slightly.
However, the best setting was simply showing the prediction alone while informing users of the
model’s accuracy [26]. Other work has shown feature-wise importances for low-dimensional inputs to
both slightly increase [17] and decrease accuracy [49]. Explanations have also been found to increase
trust and understanding [26, 28], but can hurt if they too overtly convey the model’s limitations [46].
Model complexity was also examined in [34], which found that less complex, transparent, linear
models did not help users in an apartment price prediction task. In fact, transparency hindered people
from detecting model errors, echoing other work on the risk of cognitive overload [2, 24].
We expand upon these prior works, as their limitations include (a) linear, relatively simple, or non-
neural models [34, 16, 7, 24, 26], (b) small input feature spaces, making explanations simpler [17, 34,
49], (c) imbalance of task performance between humans and AI, e.g. human performance is 51% on
a binary classification task (near random), vs. 87% for the model in [26, 25], (d) no investigation into
using explanations for certification (identifying faulty or biased models) [7, 16, 17, 25, 26, 34, 41, 49].
Certification with explanations In an ad recommendation setting, explanations allowed users to
detect that models were highly limited [15]. The authors of [35] found users able to identify the better
of two models using their interpretable method with 90% accuracy. [3] introduces “model parameter
randomization” and “data randomization” tests to analyze whether explanations are specific to the
model and input. However, there have not been extensive human studies of certification.
Design of the human-AI system Varying the stated accuracy of the model can greatly increase
trust in the model, though this trust will decrease if the observed accuracy is low [47]. There are
also potential benefits for displaying uncertainty estimates for each prediction [42], though [49]
found no improvement when showing confidence scores in textual form. “Design” covers an even
broader category of elements, such as incentives to use a ML-driven tool, level of human agency and
interactivity, and the “unremarkability” of the system [45]. These can often determine success in
real-life settings [9, 38, 10, 5], but are out of the scope of our study.
5 Conclusion
Ideally, contextualizing model predictions with explanations would help improve people’s decision-
making process in model-in-the-loop settings. Randomized control trials on this age prediction
task, however, found that additionally showing explanations with model predictions did not have a
significant effect on accuracy, trust, or understanding. Moreover, the quality of the explanations were
unimportant, and even faulty explanations did not significnatly decrease human trust in the model.
Existing interpretable ML methods have largely been used as a debugging tool for researchers and
industry engineers, rather than a mechanism for communicating with end users [6]. Our findings are
a reminder of this point and suggest input feature attributions, while helpful for machine learning
researchers, may be less useful in downstream decision-making problems. Other interpretability
methods, such as counterfactuals or natural language explanations, may be more effective but should
be properly motivated and evaluated by their downstream use if model-in-the-loop usage is a potential
goal. This echoes broader trends in human-computer interaction [18, 19] and grounded ML research,
which argue for greater situating of ML models and methods in real-world scenarios.
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Broader Impact
We chose our image classification task precisely because there are analogus models used in high-
stakes situations. There are risks to examining such a problem, as these findings could also be used
to improve ethically-dubious systems involving prediction of demographic attributes such as facial
recognition for surveillance systems or criminial identification. Complementary human and model
biases may be also be amplified in a human-AI system, further harming already disproportionately
marginalized communities.
However, we believe the machine learning community and designers of ML-powered tools may
immediately benefit from the findings of our study, as it motivates more useful explanations and
ways to design human-AI systems. Ultimately, we hope this will improve the legibility of automated
deicision systems for non-technical users and improve outcomes for those affected by ML-powered
tools.
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A Experimental Setup
A.1 Datasets, Models, and Training Details
The IMDB-WIKI dataset used to pretrain our strong model consists of 524,230 images and age labels,
and was partitioned into 90% train, 5% validation, and 5% test splits. The train, validation, and test
splits for the APPA-REAL dataset were included in the original dataset1. We also trained a “weak”
model for use in one additional treatment, which was not pre-trained on the IMDB-WIKI dataset
and not trained until convergence on the APPA-REAL dataset. Saliency maps from the weak model
tended to focus on similar features, but were often more diffuse, with fewer red spots. The strong and
weak models used pretrained ImageNet weights, while the spurious model was trained from scratch
in order to be more tuned to the spurious correlations. The model MAEs are listed in Table S1.
Table S1: Age prediction model performance in terms of mean absolute error (MAE). The MAE for
the Spurious model is on the modified APPA-REAL dataset and has slightly lower MAE than the
Strong model precisely because it is tuned into additional spurious correlations.
Model Valid MAE Test MAE
Strong 4.62 5.24
Weak 5.84 6.86
Spurious 3.33 4.58
Each model was trained on one GeForce GTX 1080 Ti using Pytorch. We used the Adam optimizer
with learning rate 0.001 (after sweeping over [0.01, 0.005, 0.001, 0.0005]). Images were scaled to
224 × 224. We performed data augmentation during training by applying additive Gaussian noise
12.5% of the time, Gaussian blur 12.5% of the time, 20 degree rotations, 5% scaling and translation
operations, horizontal flipping, and hue and saturation adjustments.
A.2 Treatment Arms
The avatar used for the Empathetic treatment is shown in Figure S1. The icon was made by Freepik
from www.flaticon.com and can be found at https://www.flaticon.com/free-icon/
robot_1587565.
Figure S1: Pat the AI.
Additional treatments We also tested the effect of explanations alone, hypothesizing that they may
have a small, but slight effect. The Explain-strong, No Pred and Explain-weak, No Pred treatments
show the saliency maps from the strong and weak model, respectively, without the prediction.
We also tested a global, model-level explanation in the Explain-guide, No Pred treatment. Before
the task begins, users are shown a grid of saliency maps and told that important regions are: “(1) the
areas around the eyes, and (2) lines anywhere on the face. The next two most important regions are
around the mouth and nose.” The researchers manually went through 200 saliency maps and tallied
regions in red in order to determine these features. Users are reminded of these guidelines at every
image. This approach is similar in spirit to [25].
For the faulty saliency maps, we additionally tested not stating the model’s performance in the No Acc
treatments. We hypothesized that allowing users to come to their own conclusion about the model’s
ability would result in the faulty explanations having a larger effect.
1Download link: http://chalearnlap.cvc.uab.es/dataset/26/data/45/description/
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Table S2: Full list of treatment arms. All model predictions are from the same “strong” model.
Treatment Arm Shorthand Description
Control Ask for age without help of model
Prediction User is shown model’s prediction
D
es
ig
n Delayed Prediction User guesses before and after seeing model’s prediction
Empathetic Model is described as a fallible “Pat the AI”
Show Top-3 Range Prediction shown as range of top-3 values, e.g. 28-32
E
xp
la
na
tio
ns
Explain-strong Show strong model’s saliency map
Explain-spurious Show spurious model’s saliency map
Explain-random Show random saliency map
Explain-strong, No Pred Show strong model’s saliency map, hide prediction
Explain-weak, No Pred Show weak model’s saliency map, hide prediction
Explain-guide, No Pred Show summary of feature importances, hide prediction
Explain-spurious, No Acc Show spurious model’s saliency map, hide model’s accuracy
Explain-random, No Acc Show random saliency map, hide model’s accuracy
A.3 Participant Demographics
40.3% of the participants were female, with a mean age of 36.5 (standard deviation 10.8).
B Results
The full regression results for MAE, accuracy, and trust are shown in Tables S3, S4, and S5. We
briefly cover findings from the additional treatments as follows:
• The instance-level explanation-only treatments (Explain-strong, No Pred and Explain-weak,
No Pred) had small, non-statistically significant effects on accuracy.
• The model-level explanation-only treatment, Explain-guide, No Pred, was helpful overall
(1.2 years increase in accuracy, compared to 1.8 years increase in the Prediction treatment).
It was also as helpful as the top performing treatments when both humans and models were
inaccurate, i.e. in the Human-Model- setting.
• Contrary to our hypothesis, hiding the model performance did not significantly increase or
decrease the effect of the faulty explanations. Directionally, however, it appeared to increase
trust in the Human-Model- setting. It may be that the statement on model performance
actually emphasized the fallability of the model.
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Table S3: Mean absolute error of guesses for all treatments. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals
in parentheses.
Treatment Arm MAE
Control (Human Alone) 10.0 (9.4 - 10.5)
Model Alone 8.5 (8.3 - 8.7)
Prediction 8.4 (7.8 - 9.0)
Explain-strong 8.0 (7.5 - 8.5)
Explain-spurious 8.5 (8.0 - 9.1)
Explain-random 8.7 (8.1 - 9.2)
Delayed Prediction 8.5 (8.0 - 9.0)
Empathetic 8.0 (7.6 - 8.5)
Show Top-3 Range 8.0 (7.4 - 8.5)
Explain-strong, No Pred 9.7 (9.2 - 10.3)
Explain-weak, No Pred 10.2 (9.5 - 10.9)
Explain-guide, No Pred 9.4 (8.9 - 10.0)
Explain-spurious, No Acc 8.2 (7.6 - 8.8)
Explain-random, No Acc 8.0 (7.6 - 8.5)
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Table S4: Estimates for yerror regression. Intercept represents control treatment (human alone);
other estimates are relative to the intercept. Lower values are better, indicating reduced error.
Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses; starred items are statistically
significant, calculated with Bonferroni correction: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
Overall
βintercept 5.9 (4.6,7.2)***
βprediction -1.8 (-2.6,-1.1)***
βdelay-model-pred -2.0 (-2.8,-1.2)***
βempathetic -2.2 (-3.0,-1.2)***
βshow-top-3-range -2.2 (-2.9,-1.3)***
βexplain-strong -2.2 (-3.2,-1.3)***
βexplain-spurious -1.9 (-2.7,-1.2)***
βexplain-random -1.6 (-2.5,-0.9)***
βexplain-strong_no-pred -0.5 (-1.5,0.3)
βexplain-weak_no-pred 0.2 (-0.7,0.9)
βexplain-guide_no-pred -1.2 (-2.0,-0.4)*
βexplain-spurious_no-acc -1.9 (-2.7,-1.0)***
βexplain-random_no-acc -2.0 (-2.6,-1.2)***
βimage-age 0.1 (0.0,0.1)***
(a) Overall
Human+Model+ Human+Model- Human-Model+ Human-Model-
N 4940 1802 1721 2812
βintercept 3.3 (2.9,3.7)*** 4.2 (3.6,4.8)*** 13.6 (12.1,14.8)*** 12.7 (10.3,15.9)***
βprediction -0.3 (-0.6,0.0) 1.1 (0.5,1.8)** -2.3 (-4.3,-1.1). -2.0 (-3.4,-0.7)*
βdelay-model-pred -0.1 (-0.4,0.3) 0.8 (0.3,1.3). -2.9 (-4.5,-1.3)** -2.3 (-3.5,-1.0)**
βempathetic -0.4 (-0.7,-0.0) 1.2 (0.6,2.0)** -2.6 (-4.2,-0.9)* -2.7 (-3.7,-1.6)***
βshow-top-3-range -0.4 (-0.8,-0.0) 0.8 (0.3,1.4) -4.5 (-6.4,-2.5)*** -1.7 (-2.8,-0.8)*
βexplain-strong -0.2 (-0.6,0.1) 1.1 (0.5,1.6)* -3.2 (-5.4,-1.2)** -2.4 (-3.4,-1.2)**
βexplain-spurious -0.2 (-0.5,0.1) 1.2 (0.7,1.7)** -2.5 (-3.9,-0.9)* -1.5 (-2.8,-0.3)
βexplain-random -0.2 (-0.5,0.2) 0.8 (0.2,1.3) -2.8 (-4.5,-1.1)** -1.7 (-3.0,-0.5).
βexplain-strong_no-pred 0.4 (0.0,0.9) 0.2 (-0.3,0.8) -1.1 (-2.8,0.4) -1.4 (-2.7,0.0)
βexplain-weak_no-pred 0.1 (-0.3,0.7) -0.1 (-0.8,0.8) 1.0 (-0.9,2.4) -0.6 (-1.8,0.9)
βexplain-guide_no-pred 0.0 (-0.2,0.4) -0.2 (-0.8,0.3) -1.1 (-2.6,0.8) -2.4 (-3.9,-1.1)**
βexplain-spurious_no-acc -0.3 (-0.7,0.1) 1.1 (0.5,1.9)** -2.3 (-3.7,-0.8) -1.2 (-2.4,0.1)
βexplain-random_no-acc -0.2 (-0.5,0.3) 1.1 (0.6,1.8)** -3.0 (-4.7,-1.6)** -2.2 (-3.2,-1.1)**
βimage-age 0.0 (0.0,0.0)* -0.0 (-0.0,0.0) 0.0 (0.0,0.1) 0.1 (0.0,0.1)*
(b) Splits
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Table S5: Estimates for ytrust regression. Intercept represents Prediction treatment; other es-
timates are relative to the intercept. Lower values indicate greater trust. Bootstrapped 95%
confidence intervals are shown in parentheses; starred items are statistically significant, calculated
with Bonferroni correction: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
Overall
βintercept 3.7 (2.5,4.5)***
βexplain-strong -0.4 (-1.1,0.4)
βexplain-spurious 0.5 (-0.4,1.2)
βexplain-random 0.5 (-0.3,1.5)
βexplain-spurious_no-acc 0.3 (-0.5,1.0)
βexplain-random_no-acc 0.4 (-0.5,1.0)
βimage-age 0.0 (0.0,0.0)*
(a) Overall
Human+Model+ Human+Model- Human-Model+ Human-Model-
N 4940 1802 1721 2812
βexplain-strong -0.1 (-0.5,0.5) 0.1 (-1.1,1.5) -1.1 (-2.7,1.0) 0.1 (-1.5,1.6)
βexplain-spurious 0.1 (-0.3,0.7) 0.7 (-0.4,1.9) -0.0 (-1.7,1.5) 1.0 (-0.3,2.1)
βexplain-random 0.0 (-0.4,0.4) 1.0 (0.1,2.4) 0.4 (-1.5,2.2) 1.4 (-0.2,2.6)
βexplain-spurious_no-acc 0.3 (-0.1,0.7) 0.7 (-0.2,1.9) 1.2 (-1.2,3.1) -0.2 (-1.8,1.1)
βexplain-random_no-acc 0.3 (-0.1,0.8) 0.7 (-0.3,1.9) -0.3 (-2.0,1.5) 0.2 (-1.2,1.2)
βimage-age 0.0 (-0.0,0.0) 0.0 (-0.0,0.1) 0.0 (-0.0,0.1) 0.0 (-0.0,0.1)
(b) Splits
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C Additional Analyses
C.1 The economic cost of Model-in-the-Loop predictions
We also consider the economic cost of a prediction, calculated simply as error × time. Under this
metric, the treatment arms are similar or worse than simply showing the model prediction: Control
(56.7), Empathetic (50.6), Explain-strong (47.2), Show Model Pred (43.5), Show Top-3 Range (42.5).
We use this simply as an illustrative example, as we believe time and cognitive load are important
considerations when designing human-AI systems, especially with possibly complex explanations of
high-dimensional inputs.
C.2 Combining human guesses and model predictions
We investigate the possible gain of combining the two predictions in simple hybrid models, whose
input features are simply the model’s prediction and the human’s guess. Such models have been
found to outperform either human or machine alone [44, 33], though this may not always be the case
[41]. We perform cross-fold validation and hyperparameter search, with the test MAE results for the
top-performing treatments shown in Table S6.
Follow-up questions to our work include: (a) how the differences between treatments can be related to
the complementarity of human and model predictions, and (b) how to best design human-AI systems
where the AI complements existing human capabilities. One experiment could be to derive coarse
strategies from these hybrid models, such as important decision tree rules, and test whether these
strategies could help further improve accuracy (i.e. “Trust the model if you think the person is above
60, and the model’s prediction is significantly greater than yours.”)
Table S6: MAE on test split of hybrid models that combine human guesses and model predictions
Prediction Explain-strong Empathetic Show Top-3 Range
Human guess (with AI assistance) 8.4 8.0 8.0 8.0
Model prediction 8.4 8.4 8.3 8.5
Logistic Regression 8.1 8.3 7.4 9.4
Decision Tree 7.1 6.3 8.4 6.0
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